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ABSTRACT 
The question of how to measure and aggregate happiness is more than a century old. In recent years, its 
relevance has risen due to efforts to replace the GDP with an index more indicative of well-being, 
though such efforts are fraught with serious conceptual problems. After briefly recalling these problems, 
we suggest to address them by using, instead of the common ordinal utility, an alternative quantity that 
is maximized in economic transactions. This quantity counts the number of future possibilities a 
commodity opens. The big advantage of this approach is that, in principle, the number of possibilities is 
an objective measure which allows for intra- and interpersonal comparison. We lay out the framework 
of the model and then discuss its relevance for social welfare. While we do here not explicitly compute a 
measure supplementing the GDP, we sketch how this could be done in practice. 
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PROBLEMS WITH THE UTILITY 
The utility function, the central ingredient to micro-economics, can be understood as an 
abstract measure for happiness. Originally this happiness was considered to be an, at least in 
principle, measurable quantity, but by the beginning of the 20
th century economists had 
convinced themselves happiness is fundamentally subjective and evades any absolute scaling. 
Quantifying one person’s levels of happiness (intrapersonal), and comparing different 
persons’ levels of happiness (interpersonal) should thus be avoided because such efforts are 
eventually meaningless. Fortunately, in 1906, Pareto showed that an ordering of preferences 
in ‘good’ and ‘not so good’ choices without an absolutely quantifiable measure is sufficient 
to reach an efficient equilibrium that maximizes happiness [1]. The absolute cardinal utility 
was thus replaced with the ordinal utility, and the concept of ‘happiness’ by that of ‘choice’ 
or ‘preference.’ Though in practice one often uses a particular quantification for the utility, 
this utility can be rescaled by an arbitrary monotonically increasing function. 
While this shift from the cardinal to the ordinal utility has been advantageous by rendering 
it unnecessary to deal with subjective quantities, the utility is a problematic concept for 
several reasons. 
The most basic problem is one of interpretation. With the use of the utility, the pursuit of 
happiness was conjectured to be the fundamental driving force of our economies. Self-
evident as that might sound, putting aside for a moment our personal strive for happiness and 
looking at the evolution of civilizations, the idea that optimization of human happiness is 
what underlies the dynamics of this system does not make much sense. Being happy about 
ones actions is not the driver of evolution, neither the biological nor the economical one. It 
just happens that those who are happy about actions that also benefit the functionality of their 
metabolism have the advantage of desiring to do what helps them survive. Stil, what is 
fundamentally important for natural selection is survival, not happiness. The deceptiveness of 
happiness becomes clear when we consider drugs that stimulate the brain’s reward system, 
promising happiness on the expenses of early death. 
However, it is unnecessary to attach any particular interpretation to the utility. In models 
building upon it goods are utilized, but for no other purpose than to optimize the utility. One 
might thus postulate the utility as just some function that people happen to optimize in their 
decisions – it is thus fundamentally a concept empty of meaning. And while this point of 
view does away with the interpretational issue and is unproblematic from a mathematical 
perspective, it is experimentally unfalsifiable and thus scientifically problematic. Without an 
interpretation of the utility function independent of consumers actions, the question whether 
consumers do optimize their utility function can no longer be decided because it was postulated 
whatever they do is expression of that optimization already, and their behavior just reveals 
their preferences (certain properties of the function however can be subject to experiment). 
Another fundamental problem is that with ordinal utilities different consumers cannot be 
compared since it cannot be decided whether one person’s happiness exceeds that of another. 
Though this seems reasonable, the problem it causes becomes clear with the second welfare 
theorem. There are arbitrarily many states of our economy optimizing individual happiness 
that differ in the distribution of wealth. If a distribution of wealth is particularly uneven, one 
does intuitively think of trying to increase happiness by redistributing from the rich to the 
poor on the rationale that a rich man is less affected by the loss of $5 than a poor man by its 
gain. Leaving aside the question how such a redistribution would be implemented, this 
process would decrease the happiness of the rich, but increase that of the poor. However, 
since the utility of different consumers cannot be compared and therefore cannot be On the problem of measuring happiness 
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aggregated, there is no way to find out whether the increase in happiness outweighs the 
decrease. There is thus no rationale for such an action based on the standard micro-economic 
theory. Only after defining a ‘social welfare function’ that essentially provides a weight for 
each consumer and thus allows to sum up or compare utilities becomes it possible to optimize 
‘social welfare.’ Exactly, what is optimized then depends in general on the definition of 
‘social welfare’ underlying the so-defined function. The utilitarian (Benthamite) welfare 
function for example treats all consumers the same irrespective of their circumstances of living. 
In contrast to this, a Max-Min (Rawlsian) welfare function is maximized when the utility of 
those consumers who have the least is the greatest. There are further various other functions 
that one can chose, each of which offers a different notion of aggregation and of ‘social 
welfare.’ The use of the ordinal utility thus rendered the notion of ‘social welfare’ ambiguous 
and made it impossible to satisfactorily tackle many important problems in welfare economics. 
THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS 
One might then ponder the question whether neuroscientific advances will eventually allow us 
to indeed measure brain activity representing particular emotional states. Even if this became 
possible however, it is doubtful this would be meaningful for the economic purpose. Not only are 
there many ways of happiness and a direct response to stimulus is only one sort, this approach 
also raises the question what the relation between such brain activity and the economic 
relevance of the brain’s owner should be. The idea that the ability of one’s brain to reach high 
levels of electrical or chemical activity means some consumers are more, some less receptive 
to the unpleasantries of poverty is morally questionable and practically not very useful. 
It thus remains the abstract notion of a preference map that is assumed to be existent but 
unknowable in principle, and only the used preferences are observable after they were acted 
upon. There are some few economists outside the mainstream who pursue the construction of 
a cardinal utility for either interpersonal or intrapersonal comparisons, based on neurological, 
psychological or statistical measures, see e.g. [2-4] and references therein. The more widely 
accepted approach of ‘New Welfare Economics’ measures people’s satisfaction with social 
conditions by their willingness to pay, respectively accept, a monetary compensation for 
change, relaxing Pareto-efficiency to Kaldor-Hicks-efficiency. However, also in this case a 
cardinal measure for utility has to be used, thus the problem of aggregation remains. 
The utility is thus an unsatisfactory basis for a model of our economy. One might instead take 
the analogy to biology seriously and attempt to explain our economy as a direct continuation 
of natural selection, an approach pursued in the context of sociobiology. And though such a 
reduction to more basic principles might theoretically be possible, our economic system 
exhibits such complex features and such a plethora of emerging social and cultural properties 
it seems a very challenging task to derive a useful model in this way. 
The question of quantifying happiness recently raised to renewed importance. Within the last 
decade, it has become widely acknowledged that the GDP is a poor measure for a nation’s 
well-being, one of the main reason being that it leaves aside the happiness of the nation’s 
citizens. There are thus many suggestions to replace or adjust the GDP with ameasure that 
better represents the nation’s success, among others the Happy Planet Index
1, the Index of 
Sustainable Economic Welfare, or the Genuine Progress Indicator (for a review on these 
alternative measures, see [5]). 
The awareness of the shortcomings of the GDP has meanwhile spread from academia to 
politics. In 2008, French President Nicolas Sarkozy asked U.S. economist Joseph Stiglitz, 
winner of the 2001 Nobel prize in Economics and a critic of free market economists, and S. Hossenfelder 
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Armatya Sen of India, who won the 1998 Nobel prize for work on developing countries, for 
advice on how to raise data more representative of his nation’s status. The French government 
has since brought into life the Commission on the measurement of economic performance and 
social progress
2 to pursue this aim. In November 2010, British PrimeMinister David Cameron 
announced his government’s plans for measuring happiness [6], and it is not hard to predict 
that other nations will follow these examples. 
Such efforts to improve the GDP and deviate competition for its optimization to a measure 
more indicative for well-being are overdue and welcome, but unfortunately do not solve the 
previously discussed problems of quantifying and comparing different people’s happiness. 
Making use of surveys or similar means to obtain data is nothing but a specific procedure of 
aggregation that attaches a chosen weight to everybody’s state of mind, making it possible to 
add the results together and arrive at a quantity for the whole nation. Intuitively, fairness 
seems to demand to assign the same weight to every citizen. But as we have seen in the 
previous section there is no scientific basis for this assignment. One might for example argue 
that a person’s suffering from environmental distress depends on their exposure and such on 
their place of living, which should be reflected in the weighting of their (un-)happiness. Or 
consider it was shown that the genetic ancestry of the majority of one nation’s citizens is 
responsible for a generally higher contempt with their social status. Should we not then take 
this into account when comparing the happiness of different nations? And if so, how? 
We are thus back at the century-old problem of how to aggregate happiness. 
POSSIBILITY VERSUS UTILITY 
Considering the problems with aggregating happiness, we will here follow a different 
approach to address the question of societal well-being. We propose that the maximization of 
utilities is not the fundamental driving force, neither of the individual, nor of our combined 
social, political and economical systems, but that it is another quantity that is being optimized. 
The hypothesis is that what we work towards instead, both personally and collectively, is 
optimizing possibilities. This quantity constitutes an utility function, thus leaving the 
apparatus of microeconomics functional as usual, but this utility function has the merit that it 
can be aggregated, thus solving the previously discussed problems. We will further argue that 
possibilities provide a substitute for happiness that is at least in principle objectively quantifiable. 
Let us start then with asking a simple question: Why do we work to get rich? Money itself is 
not of use, except possibly to paper the walls. As the saying goes, one cannot eat money. 
Money however promises safety, and it brings influence. It is not money itself that we desire, 
it is the possibilities it opens, whether we will eventually use them or not. What we aim to 
avoid is running out of possibilities, since lack of possibilities brings us in great risk of 
becoming victim of changing circumstances that we cannot adapt to. Without possibilities 
there is no change, without change there is no innovation, without innovation no progress. 
The whole power of capitalism stems from the allocation and investment of money to explore 
further possibilities. Heidegger described death as the possibility of impossibility of all 
possibilities
3, a phrase that seems equally apt also for bankruptcy. 
This might serve as a motivation for why we will in the following consider maximizing 
possibilities as the driving force for the dynamics of our economies. It should be understood 
this is a hypothesis, but one that we hope becomes plausible and whose usefulness becomes 
apparent in the following. Eventually however, it would need to be tested by contrasting it 
with real world data. But first we need to lay out what the economy looks like. On the problem of measuring happiness 
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The economic system is described by a network with N nodes of agents, exchanging M goods. 
Agents, denoted FA, could be consumers or producers, households or companies. Goods are 
anything that can be exchanged between agents, including labor, money, services or 
information. Agents have each an inventory with entries xAa(t), which is the amount of good a 
agent A has at time t in some agreed upon basis of units. The set of basis vectors containing 
one item of a good span the space of goods X, its zero vector will be denoted 0 (goods that do 
not belong to anybody may be considered belonging to a dummy agent). We will neglect that 
goods might be perishable and thus strictly speaking should have a time dependence too, but 
this could easily be incorporated in the framework. 
The links of the network are described by a tensor EABa(t), where capital indices label agents 
and run from 1 to N, and small indices label commodities and run from 1 to M. Then EABa(t) 
is the amount of good a exchanged between agents A and B at time t. The entries can be 
positive or negative valued, depending on whether a good was obtained or given away, it is 
thus
4  EABa = −EABa. We will for convenience assume that exchanging goods happens 
instantaneously. The time parameter itself is not necessarily related to any real clock, but just 
what prevents everything from happening at once, as J. Wheeler put it. Time proceeds in 
discrete steps with step size t. An agent FA with no links connected to it will have EAB(t) = 0 
for each B. We will call it ‘inactive’ at time t. We will refer to a trade as being ‘possible’ if 
the agent can reach agreement on it with an exchange partner. With a slight abuse of word, 
the trades encoded in EA do include non-exchange actions, such as giving a gift without 
return but, more importantly, connecting a good to a previously inactive node. 
The network we are considering does not grow in the sense that N and M do not change with 
time. However, a good might not have been be produced or exchanged, or an agent might 
have been inactive before a time t0. The network itself is not necessarily simply connected at 
any time. These quantities are schematically depicted in Figure 1. 
The nodes of the network are the agents with action functions FA that act on input at time t to 
produce output at time t + t 
  FA: X  X, FA:  ) ( ) ( A A t t x t x
out in    . (1) 
These functions will generally be non-linear. They contain all the details about the individual 
agent, in particular his memory, expectations and future plans and thus the conditions under 
which it will agree on transactions EAB. The actions of the agent encoded in this function will 
in general depend on what input he previously used (what goods consumed, what services 
used). The agent FA might for example contain how well maintained a factory’s machinery is, 
 
Figure 1. The state of the economy at a moment in time. Depicted are links with 
nonvanishing exchange matrices. The agent FF is inactive. 
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or what skills a worker has acquired over his lifetime. Any production process defines a 
‘netput’ vector 
  ) , ( ) ( ) ( A A t t x F t x t x
in
A A
in np     . (2) 
We will refer to two production plans as being different if their netput vectors differ. The 
state of the economy at time t is described by the set S(t) = {xA(t), EAB(t), W(t)}, where W(t) 
contains all external conditions of the world that are not already described by the network, 
such as for example the weather, the geological environment, or the political system. It also 
contains all externalities that might influence the agent’s actions but are not obtained by trade. 
The actions of agents in the network can be affected by and affect the external conditions. 
FA(t) andW(t) encode the dynamics of the system. While W(t) should in principle be given by 
an evolution law, in practice it will only be known probabilistically. Quantity FA(t) depends 
on the actions of the agent in each time step. We will use Si to refer to a specific initial state 
at time ti. 
The agent’s inventory updates according to 
    t t x F t E t t x A
B
A AB A ), ( ) ( ) (      . (3) 
saying that the inventory at time t + t is what was produced from the inventory at time t plus 
goods obtained from trade. At each time step the agents decide what to do with their 
inventory. The actions they can perform is producing output from input and/or connecting 
inventory to other nodes. They can connect to inactive nodes, which describes the creation of 
a new process (or at least the attempt to do so). Agents do not necessarily have to use all of 
their inventory at one time step. 
We can now define what we mean with the notion of possibilities. The total number of 
possibilities of the network PS(t) at one time moment is the number of different actions the 
economy’s agents could take. More important than the possibilities at one moment in time is 
the number of possible actions over a period of time. Since an agent’s actions affect that and 
others’ agents inventory and the state of the economy, the possibilities at later times will 
depend on the previous choices. Each time-ordered series of possible actions defines a history 
of the economy H(Si, te). Each different action of any agent defines a branching of the paths 
of the state of the economy. The total number of possible paths from Si to a final time te we 
will denote #H(Si, te). It will in general depend on the external conditions W(t). Figure 2 
depicts a tree of such states. 
Let us state the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis: Given an initial state Si and an endtime te the economic system maximizes #H(Si, te). 
The endtime te could theoretically be infinite, but more realistically would be the time when 
our economic system is no longer adequately described by the here proposed framework, 
either because of significant changes of the human species, our social systems, the 
environment, or a combination of those. While this is philosophically a troublesome time to 
set, we will see in the following that for practical purposes we need not fix this unknown time 
anyway. In case #H was infinite, one further would have to deal with ratios of the number of 
paths which would be an added complication but theoretically doable. However, this too will 
turn out not to be necessary in practice. 
Maximization with a given initial condition does not necessarily mean an increase of 
possibilities with time. The initial conditions could result in a breakdown of the system with 
any possible course of action, such that even the optimal history results in a decrease of 
possibilities. Note further that the quantity defined here does not leave interpretational On the problem of measuring happiness 
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Figure 2. Every path from ti to te is a possible evolution of the state of the economy S. Dots 
in this diagram correspond to states of the network as depicted in Figure 1. 
questions open. It is not the possibilities for a particular purpose that are being counted, but 
just all possibilities. 
That is as far as the evolution of the system is concerned. One should understand this in a 
similar sense to the working of natural selection that optimizes the survival chances of genes. 
While this might be the underlying trend of Nature as a whole, looking at the behavior of an 
individual organism over a short period of time, an organism might do better or worse in 
reaching this goal. Consequently, the selective process in the whole system might proceed 
faster or not so fast, and at any time we will be faced with some variety of species that 
perform differently. Thus we have to ask now how the individual behavior supports this 
maximization of possible histories. 
For this purpose we define an agent’s possibilities in a state of the economy PAS(t) as the 
number of all possible actions that the agent could take with his inventory at this time. For 
example if the agent has 3 apples, 2 empty bottles and 5 bananas, he could trade 1 to 3 apples, 
1 or 2 bottles, and/or 1 to 5 bananas with whoever is willing to trade them. Or he could 
consume some apples or bananas, or make juice of some of the apples (both of which would 
be a production process), or any combination of this. Then the space of possible actions is 
       ) ( ) ( ) (     ) ( ), (   ) ( t x t x t x t x t x t A
in
A
e
A
in
A
e
A A     , (4) 
where 
e
A x  is a possible trade for agent FA, 
in
A x  is the input of a possible production process, 
and the inequality is as usual meant to hold for every entry of the vector. This space is 
degenerate since not all of the production processes might differ in their netput vector. Once 
could e.g. add input that is not used in a process altogether, but this should not count as an 
additional possibility. Thus we formally mod out these options over the set of netput vectors 
A/{
np
A x }, meaning we only count two elements of A  as different possibilities if their 
netput vector differs. 
The number of possible actions of the agent is then the cardinality of that space 
PAS(t) = #A/{
np
A x }. 
Note that according to our definition of the exchange matrices, this space contains the actions 
of connecting goods to a previously inactive node. That would correspond e.g. to the agent of 
te
ti
SiS. Hossenfelder 
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putting his bananas on a pile and hoping for somebody to bring milk and a mixer. As before we 
then see that the number of possibilities at one time is not a particularly insightful quantity. This 
space is vast, but a lot of the possible actions will significantly decrease future possibilities (the 
bananas may just rot away). More relevant is thus the number of possible future evolutions an 
action opens. We define the space of all possible time-ordered sequences of actions from an 
initial state to an endtime to be HA(Si, te). The number of possible paths is then #HA(Si, te). 
An agent’s possibilities depend on his inventory, but they do also depend on the network 
architecture and his location in it, and thus eventually also on the actions of the other agents. 
This, too, is similar to natural selection – the agent’s performance depends on the 
environment that is also used and shaped by others. This then adds an additional uncertainty 
to his optimization problem. If he assumes all other agents decide their actions using the same 
model as he does, their behavior is not uncertain, but in general this lack of knowledge about 
the other’s behavior does enter the estimate of probabilities for different paths. What each 
agent individually tries to achieve is a maximization of future possibilities. While this would 
be an exact prescription if the evolution of the state of the world and the model agents use to 
make decisions was known, in lack of this knowledge only probabilities for possibilities can 
be given. Into the optimization then enters the agent’s willingness to take risk. 
Before discussing the consequences of this setting, let us note that the number of possible 
paths (of an agent or of the economy itself) will grow in time just because choosing from a 
fixed set options in each moment already allows for many different histories. If there are n 
different choices, and this number remains constant over time, the number of possible paths 
will grow with 
t t t i e n
  / ) ( . A more useful quantity to characterize the growth of possibilities is 
thus the natural logarithm of the number of histories Q(t): = ln PS(t), or for the single agent 
QA(t): = ln PAS(t). If the time derivative of these quantities vanishes, the set of options 
remains constant. 
Another important point is that an agent tries to maximize possible paths of actions for a 
particular time period TA. This time period might be individually different and might or might 
not exceed the agent’s own lifetime. If it is a sharp cutoff, it corresponds to the “Buxton 
Index” [7]. More generally, if the agent instead considers short-term maximization more 
relevant than longterm maximization he would discount the future in the usual way. Though 
TA theoretically could be infinitely long, humans do not usually make plans for eternity. It is 
for this reason that the endtime te is practically irrelevant since one would not expect it to 
enter any human considerations. 
In their optimization process, agents are subject to biological, physiological, psychological 
and cognitive constraints. The first three represent constraints on what an agent can or will 
agree to do, while the latter is a constraint on how well he can plan and judge. 
As far as the first three constraints are concerned, for example the survival of an agent is a 
prerequisite for her further action and thus a top priority, and she will have to balance leisure-time 
with work time to remain resilient and functional over a maximal time period. Agents might 
further have a limited ability to adapt to changing conditions which constrains their courses 
of actions and might result in self-limiting their actions to histories that evolve slow enough 
to accommodate their needs
5. These constraints are encoded in the agent’s functions FA, and 
with them taken into account the outcome of the optimization might be lowered. The 
constraints might be expressed in the form that if #HA  increases rapidly, or if there are 
substantial changes to the network structure, the productivity of the agent decreases. 
Given these constraints on what the agent can and will do, it is thus not surprising 
possibilities are positively correlated with happiness, since well-being is in many cases On the problem of measuring happiness 
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beneficial for productivity and creativity. The difference between optimizing either would 
become apparent if it could be shown people sometimes chose to increase their possibilities 
rather than increasing their happiness. While in a slowly changing environment (slow in 
comparison to effects of natural selection to become relevant, i.e. at least some generations), 
both should be well aligned with each other, in a fast changing environment happiness might 
be optimal for choices that do no longer optimize possibilities since biological adaption has 
not caught up
6. Agents also have finite cognitive abilities, meaning they will not be able to 
accurately evaluate and judge all possibilities they have and thus will make mistakes. An 
agent that performs very badly, e.g. by choosing an action that drastically limits his future 
possibilities runs in great risk of becoming inactive, and in any case reduces his potential to 
influence the course of the economy. This is just because it is exactly those with few 
possibilities who have few impact on future change. The economy will thus come to be 
dominated by agents that perform well in optimizing their possibilities
7. 
The number of an agent’s possibilities for taking a particular action represents a utility 
function of that agent. As we noted earlier, for micro-economics it is irrelevant exactly what 
the function to be optimized describes. In contrast to the usual case however, the number of 
possibilities is an absolute number that also allows for intra- and interpersonal comparisons. 
Let us then discuss how the individual level connects to the collective level. 
WELFARE ECONOMICS 
Merely looking at individual actions, the total number of possibilities for the whole economic 
system is not automatically maximized. Consider for example a network structure describing 
a free market. In this situation, we know that the individual actions will work towards Pareto 
efficiency. The number of possibilities however is an aggregated measure not taken into 
account in this efficiency. There could thus be trades that do decrease the possibilities of some 
agents, but do increase the possibilities of a larger group of agents, leading to an overall increase. 
At this point it becomes relevant that our economic systems are always complemented by 
social and political systems. The social and political context is commonly treated as external 
to the economic system, providing rules, regulations and norms, which we previously 
encoded in the function W(t). However, we should actually be interested in the combined 
dynamics of the whole, since social values, politics and economics have a non-negligible 
interaction and neither of them can strictly speaking be considered independently. Their 
separation is an additional assumption that will not in general be fulfilled. Then, for the 
question of collective optimization, the optimization should be one of all these systems 
combined. In this case, the function W(t), that we previously considered as externally given, 
is a function of the variables of the economy, and the central hypothesis is that in this case the 
optimization includes W(t). Treating the political and social environment as external is 
however often justified since one might argue that the political process operates more slowly 
than that of the economy and social norms and values change even more slowly. The question 
of social welfare we want to address in this section then concerns the combination of political 
environment and the economy. 
The central hypothesis offered here is, again, that we work towards maximizing our total 
possibilities. Pareto efficiency alone is then not necessarily optimal and thus our economic 
systems are not entirely free markets but complemented by laws, regulations, and taxes 
supposed to complete the task of optimization the economy does not already fulfill. This then 
provides a rationale for many governmental public services that lack a justification if one 
believes in the free market paradigm: a good education opens future possibilities; retirement 
options ensure we do not run out of possibilities when we age; social and health insurance are S. Hossenfelder 
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supposed to lower the risk of early death. Even the political system itself can be more or less 
helpful to this end of optimizing possibilities. Democracy is based on personal freedom, and 
providing a social and political environment supportive of upwards mobility is the essence of 
maximizing everybody’s possibilities. 
Human beings further naturally have an interest in ensuring the survival of their offspring. 
Many of us work hard to make the world a better place for future generations. The relevance 
of improving our lives and the lives of those to come is a motivation for constant innovation 
and improvement, and not spoiling the possibilities of future generations is what underlies the 
environmental movement, captured in the proverb “We do not inherit the Earth from our 
parents, we borrow it from our children,” reminding us of our responsibilities. 
Environmental protection is often origin of heated argumentation because we frequently use 
for our present well-being resources that might no longer be available in the future. 
Employing the utility function we would wonder how much more important our happiness 
now is compared to that of coming generations. As previously discussed, even neglecting our 
limited ability to predict the future, such a comparison is impossible since different agent’s 
happiness stand in no absolute relation to each other. Similarly, whether or not people were 
less happy some centuries ago because their lives were on the average shorter and offered 
fewer possibilities is a question we will probably never be able to answer. 
But with the above outlined framework we can now rephrase this discussion. Does 
voluntarily reducing growth now and thus giving up possible histories in the short-term, or 
causing a reduction of possibilities in the future and giving up branches in the long-term, 
amounts eventually, with some probability, to more or less total possibilities? And while this 
reformulation still contains the problem of estimating the evolution of the system and is 
challenged by the inaccuracy of our predictions, it does no longer entail the necessity of 
comparing agent’s ordinal utilities. 
The case is similar with uneven distributions of wealth displaying a gap between rich and the 
poor. While a comparison between a rich man’s and a poor man’s utility for $5000 cannot be 
done, the increase or decrease of future possibilities opened with this check can be compared. 
Providing a family in a developing country with basic immunizations and a mosquito net can 
vastly increase their future possibilities, while giving up the amount of money needed for this 
in a developed country might hardly decrease the number of possibilities. 
As before when comparing the now with the then, this comparison between the here and the 
there does still depend on our ability to estimate future evolution, but it got rid of the problem 
with relating different peoples’ utilities. Of course the question what action increases the total 
number of possibilities is infinitely more involved than the brief examples above. 
Redistributing wealth causes disincentives for work, which might eventually reduce 
possibilities even further. There also remain the questions of value, for example what amount 
of reducing somebody’s possibilities to increase the total possibilities is considered fair, as a 
redistribution considered unfair may lead to political frustration and eventually also decrease 
rather than increase possibilities. The point here is not to make any claims what particular 
action is beneficial for social welfare, but that the quantification of possibilities is a useful 
tool to characterize the impact of planned actions. How many possibilities is one country 
willing to give up to increase the possibilities of another country? How much risk should we 
export on future generations? These are questions that only political process can decide. What 
we can do however is to provide a measure for the impact of such decisions. 
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DISCUSSION AND SUMMARRY 
We have here proposed that individuals strive to optimize the number of future possibilities 
and that our political systems are tools to collectively improve on the total number of 
possibilities of a group or nation. Of course these tools are imperfect. Like individual human 
action, the realized political environment can work better or worse towards the maximization 
of total possibilities since we might be lacking information, understanding, or just make 
wrong decisions. Much like the efficiency of our economic system has benefitted from a 
(partial) theoretical understanding of its models, the function of our combined economical 
and political system might benefit from understanding the here proposed model. 
It is however not necessary to believe the hypothesis proposed here to find the number of 
possibilities a useful quantity: The number of possibilities provides a substitute for the 
ethereal notion of ‘happiness’ and thus makes a scientifically sound aggregation possible. 
While we have here not constructed explicit examples, it is in principle a quantifiable 
measure. For practical purposes, one would of course have to make simplifying assumptions. 
Consider one would like to quantify the possibilities of two families in two different nations 
for comparison. First, one would chose a suitable time-step, say, one month, and a suitable 
time period over which to trace histories, say, four years. Then, one would have to agree on 
what aspects of life to consider – access to goods, education, public and private services, 
health care, etc – and itemize them or assign to them suitable amounts, each constituting a 
possible, discrete, choice. In addition, one might consider a number of representative 
contingencies of interest that might happen with some probability, for example a dry summer 
or illness of a family member. After this, one could compute what possible combinations of 
choices the person can make with their monthly income. Lacking health care for example 
might mean for a family with a sick child that their possibilities are drastically reduced. 
Lacking access to transportation might reduce the access to education or medical help, both 
resulting in a lowered number of future possibilities. The selection of goods reflects the 
general infrastructure and status of the economy, while the job opportunities affect the 
families’ possibilities through the monthly available money to spend. 
Of course the so constructed measure would only be an approximate indicator of the ‘true’ 
number of possibilities and depend on the selection of histories considered, but with suitable 
choices it could provide a good impression of a nation’s well-being. 
One can devise tests for the here proposed hypothesis along the same lines. To that end, one 
needs to study situations where people, besides engaging in economic exchange, have 
collective decision making processes that supplement the free market mechanism. While 
most democracies are of that sort, for practical purposes a smaller system would be preferable. 
A real-life example may be agricultural communities in developing countries, or possibly 
some game can be devised which simulates a suitable setup. One then needs again a 
quantification and discretization of possibilities as outlined in the previous paragraph. The 
question to test is whether people collectively strive to a situation where, given sufficient 
information, the aggregated number of possibilities for all of them is maximized. 
In summary, we have proposed here that the dynamics of our combined economic and 
political systems work towards optimizing the number of possibilities. Considering only the 
economy, the number of possibilities constitutes a cardinal utility function that allows intra- 
and interpersonal comparison, and thus makes aggregation possible. This aggregation results 
in an additional measure whose optimization cannot be achieved within the economy alone, 
thus providing a rationale for politically pursued social welfare. We have further outlined S. Hossenfelder 
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how the number of possibilities can in practice be calculated by selecting representative 
goods, public and private services, as well as contingencies. In this manner, it may provide a 
measure supplementary to the GDP. 
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REMARKS 
1http://www.happyplanetindex.org. 
2http://www.stiglitz-sen-fitoussi.fr/en. 
3Die Möglichkeit der Unmöglichkeit aller Möglichkeiten. 
4In an economy with fiat money, most of the exchange will happen via one particular good 
4that counts this money. While the exchange matrix then will remain mostly empty, this case 
4is also covered by the outlined framework. 
5Irvin Yalom lists ‘freedom’ as one of the four existential fears, since being faced with too 
5many choices can greatly increase the anxiety to make irreversible mistakes. Some religious 
5sects refuse making use of medical or technological achievements of our modern 
5civilizations 
5(one might say though with the attempt to increase possibilities in afterlife). These are only 
5two examples of how psychological constraints might result in self-limiting ones possibilities. 
6A large number of people in the Western world nowadays suffers from permanent stress in 
6reaction to the demands of their every-day life. This biological stress reaction is arguably a 
6relic of evolution that is in most cases no longer beneficial in the modern world. One may 
6ponder the question then if not the holding-on to a stressful lifestyle is an expression of 
6optimizing possibilities rather than happiness. 
7At least over their own lifetime. Increasing one’s lifespan or immortality could result in a 
7dramatic increase of individual possibilities. It is thus unsurprisingly a goal that is vigorously 
7pursued. 
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O PROBLEMU MJERENJA SREĆE 
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SAŽETAK 
Pitanje kako mjeriti i prikupljati sreću starije je od stoljeća. Zadnjih godina njegovo je značenje poraslo zbog 
težnji da se BDP zamijeni indeksom koji bi bolje indicirao blagostanje, iako su takve težnje povezane s 
ozbiljnim konceptualnim problemima. Nakon kraćeg navođenja tih problema predlaže se da im se pristupi, 
umjesto uobičajenom ordinalnom korisnošću, alternativnom veličinom koja je maksimizirana u ekonomskim 
transakcijama. Ta veličina broji buduće mogućnosti koje se otvaraju zahvaljujući robi. Velika prednost ovog 
pristupa je to što je, u principu, broj mogućnosti objektivna mjera koja omogućuje individualnu usporedbu ili 
usporedbe više osoba. Postavljen je okvir modela i prodiskutirano njegovo značenje za društveno blagostanje. U 
radu nije izravno izračunata mjera kojom bi se zamijenio BDP nego je naznačeno kako bi se to provelo. 
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